I have a piece up at National Review Online about the Antisemitism Awareness Act. As described in my article, the most important feature of the act is that it codifies administrative guidance that began in the Bush Administration holding that Jews are protecting from ethnic discrimination by Title VI of the 1964 Civil Rights Act. Before 2003, the Department of Education treated Jews an exclusively religious group not covered by the Act.

The controversial part of the Act is that it codifies the International Holocaust Remembrance Alliance's (IHRA) working definition of antisemitism in the context of determining discriminatory intent for related allegedly discriminatory actions in Title VI enforcement. That definition gives examples of statements that, depending on the context, could be antisemitic. Some of those examples relate to Israel, and one of those discusses the use of anti-Jewish tropes with origins in Christian polemic used against Israel. This had led to hysterical and wildly inaccurate claims that the law criminalizes criticism of Israel, or will somehow lead to making Christianity illegal. I explain in the peace why these claims are nonsense. I note that It's hard to imagine anyone sensible arguing that the statement, "Of course Israel is massacring Palestinians, that's exactly what Christ-Killers would do" can't be evidence of discriminatory intent for related action.

More sober critics, like co-blogger Eugene V. earlier today, worry about the chilling effect it will have on anti-Israel speech given that hostile environment cases sometimes rest in part on speech that would otherwise be constitutionally protected. I respond so such critics as follows:

That is indeed a real concern. But that's a problem with hostile-environment law more generally. With or without official adoption of the IHRA definition, university officials already have an incentive to clamp down on all sorts of speech that could be deemed hostile to various groups. In practice, though, they mostly use Title VI as an excuse to try to censor speech that offends woke sensibilities.

That, in fact, is the broader reason wokesters are hostile to AAA. Currently, there is a double standard, with antisemitic speech that might contribute to a hostile environment treated with much more equanimity than speech hostile to other groups. This is illegal discrimination against Jewish students, and is essential to the entire DEI edifice. If the AAA and other new laws incentivize universities to treat members of all protected classes (including white students discriminated against based on race) equally, than the whole ideological structure of DEI as we know it, which depends on preferences for favored groups, collapses.

Returning to the more hysterical critics, I note that

the Department of Education has been using the IHRA definition of antisemitism for Title VI enforcement since 2018. As president, Donald Trump also issued an executive order making the IHRA definition applicable government-wide. Over 30 states and dozens of localities have adopted the IHRA definition. Criticism of Israel is still legal, as is, of course, reading and preaching the New Testament. Those who claim that the limited adoption of this definition for evidentiary purposes in Title VI proceedings is a big step on the road to authoritarian dystopia are displaying a combination of ignorance and mendacity, often with a significant dollop of anti-Jewish conspiracy theory.

I never say in the piece whether I like the IHRA definition, or whether I think it should be codified for Title VI (or other) purposes. But there is so much misinformation floating around that I thought it was important to clarify the very low stakes of this bill, given that it does not change the status quo.

The letter, which as of this writing has over 200 hundred signatories, starts off like this:

Social and Personality Psychologists on Student Protests for Justice in Palestine
We are a group of faculty from various demographic, religious, and ethnic backgrounds who are trained in the methods and practice of social and personality psychology. Although there are no doubt many topics on which we disagree, we are united in this call to listen to, engage with, and protect our students as they protest the mass killings of Palestinian civilians—which the International Court of Justice of the United Nations determined "could amount to genocide."

The words in quotations do not appear in the ICJ's opinion. The closest the Court comes to saying anything like that is to say that "at least some of the acts and omissions alleged by South Africa to have been committed by Israel in Gaza appear to be capable of falling within the provisions of the (Genocide) Convention." The Court, however, made no finding as to whether South Africa's allegations were true, and the Genocide Convention bars actions that are not "genocide," such as incitement to genocide. The only time the words "amount to genocide" without the "could" appear in the opinion is in the court's summary of South Africa's allegations.

It says a lot about the decline of intellectual integrity in academia that so many are willing to sign a statement without due diligence to ensure that what they are signing is accurate, and that whomever drafted the letter either did not bother to check that the letter was accurate, or knew it was inaccurate but did not care.

There's a new proposal on Capitol Hill to improve air travel. On the one hand, it will slow down passenger screening and lengthen checkpoint lines.  On the other hand, it will make you a little less safe.

Remarkably, the idea of combining slower TSA wait times with weaker security has bipartisan support from fourteen Senators, led by Sen. Merkley (D-OR) and Sen. Kennedy (R-LA). Naturally, they're not selling their proposal that way. Instead, they claim to be saving air travelers from themselves—and from Big Brother.

They're wrong on all counts.

The Merkley-Kennedy amendment to FAA reauthorization will be offered in the next few days. If passed, it would prevent TSA from expanding its use of face recognition technology in place of ID checks.

This is remarkable. We've all gone through TSA checkpoints juggling a carry-on in one hand and a briefcase or purse in the other while using any leftover hands to hold wallets and present IDs to the TSA officer. Lacking four hands, each passenger spends time fumbling with these items at the checkpoint, guaranteeing an extra couple of minutes' delay; at a busy airport, that all adds up to much longer wait times for everyone

TSA's pilot project, Touchless ID, is far more efficient.  I saw it in action at Atlanta's airport as a member of the Commission on Seamless and Secure Travel. Passengers walk up, stand on a circle, look at the camera, and are cleared in seconds. Even when the neighboring PreCheck line was backed up, the lane for Touchless ID never had more than one or two people in it. I've never seen happier people at a TSA checkpoint.

Maybe that's what worries politicians and groups like the ACLU, who have campaigned relentlessly against facial recognition. They're afraid they'll lose if they let ordinary travelers make up their own minds about TSA and facial recognition.

It sure looks like that's what Senators Merkley and Kennedy have in mind. Their amendment would flat-out prohibit TSA from expanding face recognition at its checkpoints—in Atlanta or at an airport near you.

What justifies this ban? Well, advocacy groups claim that face recognition invades privacy and discriminates based on travelers' race. But neither charge is true.

Privacy fears are particularly overdone; the system I saw compared a picture the government already had (a passport photo) to a picture taken at the checkpoint and then discarded. And everyone who got in that lane knew what they were doing; the whole process is built on consent

Claims of bias based on skin tone or race, meanwhile, are years out of date. According to recent studies by TSA and CBP and by NIST, facial recognition systems demonstrate a negligible difference in accuracy when identifying members of different groups, as long as the systems use good algorithms, good lighting, and good cameras. TSA's sister agency, Customs and Border Protection (CBP), uses such a system already, and in daily use, it shows no significant demographic disparities, operating at an accuracy rate that consistently exceeds 98 percent.

What about security? It turns out that human beings are nowhere near 98 percent accuracy when they check ID. The technology is far better at matching faces than even experienced passport examiners. As for bias, it's worth remembering that handing decisions to human being doesn't eliminate that risk. If you want to be safer, and run less risk of bias, algorithmic face recognition is the better choice.

That leaves just one question for supporters of the Kennedy-Merkley amendment.

Why are you afraid to let travelers make their own decisions about face recognition?

Various district courts have put out such orders; here's the most recent I've seen, a Standing Order on Requests for Hearings and Oral Arguments from Magistrate Judge David Horan (N.D. Tex.):

With regard to possible oral argument or an evidentiary hearing, the Court notes a trend today in which fewer cases go to trial and in which there are fewer speaking or "stand-up" opportunities in court, particularly for junior lawyers (that is, lawyers practicing for less than seven years). The Court encourages litigants to be mindful of opportunities for junior lawyers to conduct hearings or oral argument before the Court, particularly hearings or oral arguments as to which the junior lawyer drafted or contributed to the underlying motion or response.

In those instances in which the Court is inclined to rule on the papers, a representation that the oral argument would be handled by a junior lawyer – or by a lawyer who has more than seven years in practice but who has had less than five speaking appearances in any federal court – will weigh in favor of holding oral argument. The Court understands that there may be circumstances in which having a junior lawyer handle a hearing or oral argument might not be appropriate – such as where no junior lawyers were involved in drafting the motion or response or where the motion might be dispositive in a "bet-the-company" type case.

Even so, the Court believes it is crucial to provide substantive speaking opportunities to junior or other less experienced lawyers and that the benefits of doing so will accrue to junior lawyers, to clients, and to the profession generally. The Court encourages all lawyers practicing before the Court to keep this goal in mind.

This relates to a potentially complicated matter in many professions, I think.

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